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I.  Introduction
The costs of justice to both the taxpayer and the litigant appear to have risen faster
than GDP in recent years, and it is scarcely surprising that both Conservative and
Labour Governments, concerned about public expenditure trends, have brought
expenditure on the courts and on legal aid under close scrutiny.  In England and Wales
escalating spending on legal aid in civil actions has led to the introduction of a
franchising system and a significant move towards no-win-no-fee arrangements in
cases where personal injury damages
1 are involved.  In Scotland, the passage of the
Crime and Punishment (Scotland) Act 1997 allows for the introduction of state-
employed public defenders for criminal legal aid work -- widely seen as a cost
curtailing measure.
A general explanation of this relative rise in expenditure suggests that it is
inevitable.  It is claimed that the judicial process is inherently highly labour intensive so
that productivity gains which follow from the substitution of capital for labour, as
found in manufacturing industry, cannot be achieved.  This disadvantage cannot be
offset by a fall in relative rates of remuneration of judges, lawyers and administrators
which will depend on comparable opportunities in professional employment elsewhere
in the economy, where labour’s productivity and hence real wage is generally
increasing.  Thus, while growth in manufacturing costs will be offset by increases in
productivity per head, costs to secure judicial ‘output’ will rise even if no extra inputs
are required (see Baumol, 1996).  There are some doubts about formulation of this
hypothesis and the evidence supplied to substantiate it (see Peacock, 1998) but even if
it were true, this would not preclude the strong possibility that, in an imperfect market
for judicial services, better resource use could be achieved by more efficient
management and, indeed, by removing the imperfections themselves.
This paper concentrates on the efficiency issue and, while concerned primarily
with civil justice, many of the points made here carry over into the criminal field.
Despite the substantial differences between England and Wales and Scotland in respect
of the content of civil law and procedure, efficiency is  a common problem and
methods for improving it have been ‘traded’ between the two systems.  Differences in
legal terminology are explained in a glossary.
                                                       
1  From July 1995 in England and Wales, conditional fees can be agreed in personal injury cases,
applications to the European Court of Human Rights, and insolvency cases.  To date, it has been
personal injury cases that have dominated this business (See Yarrow, 1998).  The Law Reform
(Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1990 made similar provisions for solicitors and advocates
in Scotland, using the term “speculative basis” as a reflection of the long standing practice at the
Scottish Bar.2
The legal profession itself has recognised the need for reform.  In both the
Woolf Report (1995, 1996) and the Cullen Report (1995), fairly major
recommendations for change in current procedural arrangements are made.  Indeed,
some reforming action has already been taken, and reform is certainly not a novelty to
any of the legal systems in the UK.  For example, in England and Wales recent reform
is evidenced by the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 (permitting licensed
conveyancers and implementing many of the recommendations of the 1988 Civil
Justice Review under Sir Maurice Hodgson), and by Lord Mackay’s ending in 1995 of
the Bar’s monopoly regarding rights of audience in the higher courts.  In Scotland, the
sheriff court ordinary cause rules have recently been revised, thereby introducing
simplified procedures and allowing Sheriffs a much greater degree of discretion in case
management.  Also in Scotland, an optional procedure for personal injury cases has
been introduced in the Court of Session.   In a similar vein, an optional commercial
cause procedure, involving a judge (initially Lord Penrose) dedicated to specific cases
and empowered to intervene managerially in procedure,  has successfully reached the
end of an extensive pilot stage.
There is some concern, however, that, at least in Scotland, the process is
currently stalled (see Wadia, 1998).  And in England and Wales, where reform is
moving ahead, it is generally in the face of stiff resistance.  In part, this may be ascribed
to a confusion over objectives.  A prime focus of discussion has been the perceived
lengthy delay in the dispensation of civil justice (see below).  Does this imply we
require speedy  justice?  If so, accuracy may well suffer if speedier court decisions
become more error prone.  There has also been an outcry regarding the expense of
civil justice -- both in terms of the civil legal aid bill and in terms of the prohibitive bills
that can face a private litigant who lacks either legal aid, trade union backing or legal
expenses insurance.  In this context, considerable attention has been given to the legal
aid earnings of solicitors and counsel
2.  Could the same amount of ‘justice’ be obtained
more cheaply, or could more ‘justice’ be on offer for the same expenditure?  Any
answer raises a further question concerning the costs and benefits to those who supply
and demand justice, and to those called upon to finance it -- the taxpayers
(representing the community at large) or those paying directly for legal services.
                                                       
2  The House of Lords were recently asked to consider an appeal from a group of advocates whose fees
in certain murder appeal cases were reduced on taxation.  This included Mr Michael Mansfield, QC,
whose request for fees had been reduced from £22,300 to £12,200 on taxation (Sunday Times 18 June
1998).  Part of the argument made on behalf of the Bar counsel was that the Law Society references to
appropriate legal aid rates in terms of the £120,000 per year earnings of NHS consultants were
inappropriate.  The appeal was denied on 15 October when the Law Lords declared that in the case of
one bill, cut from a claimed £35,000 to a taxed £14,000, even the reduced figure was “in our view3
Costs and delay.
In the statistical annex to the Woolf Report (1996) a survey based on a sample
of the taxed costs of the winning side in over 2,000 High Court cases reveals
surprisingly high costs.  Across 9 distinct categories of case (medical negligence,
personal injury etc.) where the claim value is under £12,500 the average or median costs
of the winning side are invariably in excess of 100% of the claim value.  This
proportion drops markedly, however, as the size of the claim rises.  Thus for personal
injury cases the median percentage falls to 41% for claims between £12,500 and £25,000.
It then drops to 28% for those between £25,000 and £50,000 and eventually reaches
11% for claims in excess of £250,000.  This same survey also reveals delay, another
cost consideration, to be a problem.  The median duration from the date of instruction
to conclusion for personal injury cases is 54 months.  Medical negligence cases move
even more slowly with a median duration of 61 months, while across the sample of
cases as a whole the median duration is 29 months.
Regulation.
Part of the problem is that justice is a complex product.  It is a professional
service which for many infrequent users of the court system has to be bought as a
matter of faith or trust (as a ‘credence’ good) rather than being, as most commodities,
purchased frequently and repeatedly (an ‘experience’ or ‘search’ good).  Many
professional services (e.g., accountancy, law, medicine) share such a characteristic and
for this and other reasons the legal profession, as most others, is regulated (self-
regulated, in fact) with respect to entry, personal behaviour and business conduct.
Precedent and externality.
A further complication arises from the fact that civil justice, as dispensed daily
between rival parties in the courts, affects the interests of many others who may only
be contemplating litigation.  This spillover produces what economists term an
‘externality’ which, for the individual, may be positive or negative, depending on the
effect on a particular party or interest.  The effect is readily understood in the case of
precedents, or new rules, established by judges in novel cases.  Unless subsequently
overturned in a higher court, a precedent favouring a plaintiff may increase the
probability of success for other plaintiffs and lower their costs, and mutatis mutandis
raise the costs of defending such actions (but see section III below).
But there is also a wider and empirically more important spillover impact that
relates to the notion of what Mnookin and Kornhauser (1979) label  ‘bargaining in the
shadow of the law’.  In addition to those caught up in the formal legal system, the
behaviour of parties engaged in disputes and indeed of those for whom no dispute is in
hand but whose behaviour might engender a dispute -- all of these --are affected by the
civil justice system.  The prospect of ending up in a court room with the generally
accepted prospect of liability, damages, and costs leads all individuals and enterprises
to take a higher level of care, thereby avoiding many disputes.  The knowledge of what
might happen if a dispute ends up in court also facilitates entry into voluntary (or at
least non-judicial) resolution of many disputes that do arise.  It is worth remembering
that even among the cases set down or filed in court, only around 5% ever come4
before a judge for final judgement or proof.  The remainder settle by mutual agreement
-- but with the settlement parameters defined by expectations of what would happen in
court
3.
Thus in evaluating the civil justice system or in recommending change, it is,
therefore, important to bear in mind that it is part of a large dispute resolution process,
and changes here will have potentially significant knock-on effects elsewhere.  In this
sense, looking at court-room procedure in isolation is not at all appropriate.  As the
externality example demonstrates, a further complication is that there are very obvious
and potentially serious distributional questions involved.  If poor people are to be
allowed to have their grievances addressed in court, then they must be provided with
resources.  Where to draw the line, in terms of which people are to be deemed in need
of support and the extent of the support to provide any one person in a particular case,
then becomes a value judgement. These distributional questions tend to distract policy
makers from focusing on the efficiency aspect, and, indeed, often threaten to derail
reform.  Our analysis here focuses first on efficiency before turning to the distributional
issue, which we treat as an important but distinct problem.  Our conclusion is that
there is scope in the system for substantial experimentation with procedural reform,
and that as much as possible should be done to encourage the development of a
cafeteria-style of civil justice system with improved information flows and provision
for innovations such as cost capping and risk sharing between legal representatives and
clients.
In section II of the paper, we look at the general market characteristics of the
supply and demand for civil justice by examining the product specification.  Then, in
section III, we take up the notion of externality and examine its implications for
reform.  In section IV we address the various possible remedies for the market
imperfection arising out of the externality, while in section V we turn to the vexed
issue of distribution.  The paper concludes in section VI with some suggestions
regarding reform strategies that may guide policy makers in this area.
II.  Product specification
As has been discussed in the introduction, civil justice is a service, and that service is
dispute resolution.  The formal civil justice system is just part of a spectrum of dispute
resolution mechanisms that are at work throughout the economy.  But in many ways it
is the cogwheel that drives the whole system.  It represents the court of last resort --
when all other forms of dispute resolution fail to bring the parties together in a
mutually satisfactory way, it stands ready to bring closure to any competent dispute.
In addition it possesses enforcement power to ensure compliance with its ruling
(diligence), and it possesses a rule-setting attribute in the form of precedents and
procedural rules.
                                                       
3 This is in marked contrast with the experience in the continental inquisitorial system where pre-trial
settlement is much lower.  In France, for example, the figure is typically around 25% (Doriat and
Deffains, 1998).5
All the other commonly used forms of dispute resolution depend in some way
on this formal element.  These alternatives work only because the courts operate in a
particular way in allocating and enforcing liability, damages, and costs according to
well understood rules.  This influence on the operation of each of these particular
alternatives is not generally afforded explicit acknowledgement.  Furthermore, whether
it is breach of contract, tort-based harm, or marital dissolution, behaviour that is likely
to result in a dispute will be influenced by the parameters set in the civil courts.  For
example, given the prospect of an injured party being able to seek redress, with
recourse if need be to the courts, individuals and enterprises are induced to behave in a
more considerate manner.  The rules set explicitly and implicitly by the courts also
remove the uncertainty about which party is to bear any risk, and thereby allows
appropriate action to be taken to mitigate that risk.
Demand.
As mentioned in the introduction, there are, in general, two types of purchaser
of civil legal services.  The first is the one-time buyer for whom the costs of obtaining
and evaluating information on the range and quality of legal services available can be
high.  Purchases are, therefore, typically made on faith, and for this type of buyer legal
service is a credence good, where it can be argued that some form of third-party
regulation is beneficial.  The second type is the professional or repeat buyer, who may
be a business enterprise.  Here there is ample opportunity to gain information on the
nature of suppliers and to make informed purchases based on experience.  To these
buyers, legal services are an experience good, where the normal stricture of caveat
emptor leads to an efficient outcome.  Thus the Automobile Association (AA), with a
high volume of members’ cases requiring legal representation but with these cases
being of a fairly standard and well specified nature, can enter into block contracts with
solicitors around the country whereby a set price can be agreed for a given standard of
service in a set number of cases.
It can be argued that, even among the one-time buyers, social networks and reputation
(not to mention brand labelling) can overcome the information asymmetry that exists
between lawyer and client, thereby improving the client’s prospect of obtaining good
service
4.  But, be that as it may, it is for this credence-good group that the legal
professions justify regulations regarding entry and conduct.  Regulation comes from
the relevant Law Society in the case of solicitors, from the Bar Council for barristers,
and from the Faculty of Advocates for advocates.
Regulation.
The market for legal services is  an imperfectly competitive market.  As
explained above, lawyers -- advocates, barristers and solicitors -- are regulated (self-
regulated) private suppliers of services.  Entry to the professions is not open to all, but
carefully controlled by stipulation of educational and professional qualifications as well
                                                       
4 In economists’ jargon, labelling or reputation helps avoid what has come to be known as the “market
for lemons” problem that tends to arise in such situations whereby poor quality products drive out
better quality, so spoiling the market.6
as defined practical experience.  Thus, Baldwin (1997) explains how in England and
Wales aspiring solicitors require to secure a recognised law degree or to pass the
Common Professional Examination/Diploma (CPE) in law before taking the Legal
Practice Course (LPC) and on successful completion of this securing a training
contract with a qualified solicitor, during which time a Professional Skills Course
(PSC) must be completed.  The Bar Council administers a similar set of admission
procedures for aspiring barristers (qualifying law degree or CPE, Bar Vocational
Course (BVC) and a twelve month period of pupillage after which a position in a
Chambers (tenancy) may be sought.
Once accepted by the profession, each type of practitioner is subject to a code
of professional conduct.  In addition, both the capacity (number of  courtrooms and
judges) and admission charges (court fees) to their most formal operating arena, the
courts, are determined in an administrative procedure -- either directly by the
government or through  some quasi-governmental agency such as the Lord
Chancellor’s Department or the Scottish Courts Administration.
Supplier-induced demand and collusion.
For the uninformed buyer, there remains the problem of supplier-induced
demand
5, whereby the legal practitioner is in the position of both recommending the
quantity and quality of product to be purchased and simultaneously supplying it (and
thereby possibly engaging in the practice of “fee-building”).  There are clear principal-
agent problems here.  This is one reason that can be advanced for accepting a
substantial regulation of the profession in order that behaviour can be policed
effectively.  Regulation, however, brings its own problems owing to the potential it
creates for collusive behaviour and restrictive practices.  Collusive behaviour would
arise, for example, were all solicitors agree to refrain from competing on price by using
standard fee schedules to price their services.  In conveyancing, the use of such
mandatory fee schedules or fixed fee scales was in operation in Scotland until 1985 (in
England and Wales until 1974).  Self-imposed restrictions on recruitment of new
trainees
6, or on price and non-price competition through advertising, or on
organisational form (e.g. multi-disciplinary practices) could all result from collusive
behaviour.
Deregulation.
In many ways there has been a remarkable deregulation of the profession over
recent years (see Stephen and Love (1998)).  For example, following a 1976
investigation by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) and subsequent
government pressure, by the mid-1980s advertising by solicitors was permitted --
although within certain bounds and generally stopping short of anything approaching
the unthinkable “touting for business”.  Since 1985 solicitors have been permitted to
                                                       
5 Sometimes less contentiously labelled ‘provider moral hazard’.  See Bevan (1996).
6 Baldwin (1997, p.23) relates how in 1995 the Law Society investigated the possibility of regulating
the number of places on Legal Practice Courses (LPC) and, hence, entry to the profession.
Unsurprisingly, they were advised that this would be illegal (a restraint of trade).7
operate in a corporate form, and since 1990 they may form partnerships with non-
solicitors in England. Since 1977, Queen’s Counsel have been permitted, under the
Scottish system, to revise pleadings directly rather than through a junior, and to appear
without junior counsel.  Furthermore, the idea that any junior counsel (whose
involvement the senior continues to have a right to insist upon should this be felt
necessary) should  automatically be paid a fee at a rate of two-thirds that of the senior
has also been swept away.  However, advocates in Scotland retain the legal right to
conduct a case without any regard to the wishes of the client, and, on the grounds of
public policy, the advocate is deemed not liable for any wrong advice in law,
negligence, mistakes etc.  While barristers in England and Wales retain considerable
immunity from negligence suits, their position is now less strong in the area of non-
litigious and pre-trial work.  In contrast, solicitors are liable for losses consequent on
breach of duty, although it is interesting to note that taking the opinion of counsel
substantially protects a solicitor. But, as the recent paper by Reeves (1998) on the
system of  Queen’s Counsel in England and Wales argues, the professions are still
subject to criticism regarding restrictive practices.  Reeves’ arguments include claims
regarding the closed nature of the procedure of appointment to silk, that becoming a
silk is the main route into the ranks of the higher judiciary, and that the elevation to
silk facilitates both the restrictive practice of using juniors and the charging of higher
fees.
Apart form the directly involved parties, right of audience in court by any other
than an advocate, barrister or solicitor is severely restricted.  There is provision in
Scotland for cases under the Debtors (Scotland) Act 1987 and other summary cause
procedures in the sheriff courts to allow representation by a layman friend of the party.
But here the court has to be satisfied that the person is qualified, and the practice
seems mostly to be used as a device for allowing trainees to appear.  As of 1991, it is
possible  for solicitors in both England and Wales and in Scotland, after satisfying
certain training courses and other hurdles set by their respective Law Societies, to gain
right of audience in the higher courts
7, previously the exclusive domains of barristers
and advocates who had to be briefed by solicitors, thereby, it is alleged, adding to
costs.
Perhaps the greatest step forward in England and Wales regarding alternative
representation has been the provision under the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990
for non-solicitors to provide conveyancing services (through licensed conveyancers).
While there has been substantial entry to this new profession, Stephen and Love (1996)
find little evidence of downward pressure on prices, although Domberg and Sherr
(1996) are more positive in their appraisal.  Although, in 1990, a Scottish
Conveyancing and Executry Services Board was set up under the Law Reform
(Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1990, by 1992 it had been suspended in the
face of the housing market collapse, having made no impact.  By and large, therefore,
conveyancing in Scotland is left to the solicitors.  Indeed, the very Scottish cartel-like
exclusive arrangements among solicitors to advertise and sell properties (e.g., the
                                                       
7   These higher courts being the Crown Court and the High Court in England and Wales, and the
Court of Session and the High Court in Scotland.8
Edinburgh Solicitors Property Centre) were recently investigated by the Office of Fair
Trading for restricted practices and exonerated.
Judges and court fees.
While, in most markets, market forces ensure that any upturn in demand brings
forth an increase in supply, in the area of legal services the determination of overall
judicial capacity (a key feature of the system) is an administrative decision of the
government.  In England and Wales there are  96 High Court Judges (up from 78 in
1985), 539 Circuit Judges (371 in 1985), 1207 Recorders and Assistant Recorders
(992 in 1985), and 337 District Judges (189 in 1985).   In Scotland, the Court of
Session currently has 26 full-time judges (up from 23 in 1985), known as Senators of
the College of Justice and also responsible for criminal business in the High Court, and
the sheriff courts have six Sheriff Principals, 109 Sheriffs
8, and 119 temporary sheriffs
(up from 6 sheriff principals, 88 sheriffs, and 61 temporary sheriffs in 1985).  Growth
in judicial capacity is, therefore, clearly a reality, but it is difficult to describe the
process by which it occurs as market-responsive.
Court fees are levied for all court business and there has been a marked move
over recent years to ensure that fees are set at a level that covers court operating costs
(including judges’ salaries).  For example, in the Scottish higher courts, targets of
covering at least 80 per cent of all costs in 1996-97 and 90 per cent in 1997-98 were
both successfully attained
9.  One major scheduling consideration peculiar to Scotland is
that civil justice, in general, is placed as a residual claimant in the system owing to the
priority given to criminal cases in allocating judicial resources.  This priority is due to
the 80-day and 110-day rules in Scots  Law whereby detained suspects
10 must be tried
or released within that period (1-year for those at freedom but charged).
Lawyers.
In terms of the supply of lawyers, there is a widely held view on both sides of
the Atlantic that the market is kept artificially in short supply, so ensuring practitioners
unusually high earnings.  In fact, careful scrutiny of the data for the USA by Rosen
(1992) shows that lawyers on average earn a reasonable level of pay that is
commensurate with the longer training period that is necessary for qualification and the
usually longer hours per week that lawyers work.  Figures on entry to the professions
also show that there has been remarkably easy entry to the profession over recent
                                                       
8 These statistics are taken from The Lord Chancellor’s Department Judicial Statistics for
England and Wales,  Scottish Court Service,  Annual report and Accounts 1996-7, and Civil
Judicial Statistics Scotland.  Thanks are also due to Mrs Hardie and Mr Ritchie of the Scottish Court
Service for help with some of these statistics.
9 These fact are revealed in the 1996-7 and the 1997-98 Annual Accounts of the Scottish Court
Service.  The higher courts are the sheriff courts and the Court of Session.
10 The 80-day rule pertains to the time limit for an indictment on a person in custody under petition
(solemn procedure).9
decades -- notwithstanding the fear that supply could be constrained by manipulation
or control over training places
11.
Recent figures
12 on the profitability of legal practices among solicitors in
Scotland show that for profit-sharing partners the median level of profit per partner
was £44,934 with an interquartile range from £30,683 to £62,113.  Of course not
everyone reaches the level of partner.  Recent figures from the Law Society
13 reveal
that average annual earnings among  male (female) solicitors are: assistant solicitors
£24,000 (£23,000); salaried partner £40,200 (£33,000); and equity partners £50,520
(£40,180).   What often catches the headlines is the earnings, or putative earnings, of
“superstars”.  It is true that there is a remarkably wide variation in earnings within the
legal profession.  This is, as Rosen (1981) explains, simply a manifestation of talent
commanding its market rate.  If there is one outstanding barrister (say) who can deliver
a 10% higher chance of winning than any alternative barrister, and if there is a net £1
million at stake, then it is easy to see how that barrister could command a premium fee
of some £100,000.
Judges salaries
14 (usually taken to represent the high end of the salary range for
the non-”superstars”) do not suggest unusually high remuneration when compared
with other senior responsible jobs.  In 1998 a High Court Judge or one of the less
senior (Outer House) Court of Session Judges earns £117,752 per year.  The more
numerous sheriffs earn £88,077, and district judges earn £70,820.  But judges’ positions
offer a substantially more secure stream of earnings (not to mention pension) than that
enjoyed by most barristers or advocates.
Other participants in the legal process.
The court system also depends on other actors, not least among whom are
witnesses and juries.  In England and Wales, jury trials in civil cases have been severely
limited since the Administration of Justice Act 1933.  They number less than 400 or so
cases per year, and are generally restricted to defamation and fraud cases.  In Scotland,
where jury trials were re-introduced in 1815 to come into line with the then English
practice, juries
15 may still be used in the Court of Session in claims for personal
                                                       
11  See Baldwin  1997, for a comprehensive discussion of regulation of the legal profession in England
and Wales.  In one example (p. 68) he quotes the 2400 applicants for places on the Bar Vocational
Course at the Inns of Court School of Law (one of 8 such providers), where some 883 completed the
course in 1994, of whom only 657 secured a pupillage by October 1994.  Set against the 500 or so
tenancies that are expected to be available in any year, then professional entry is certainly no
unchecked.  That said, some of what is going on here is undoubtedly quality screening (e.g.,
acceptance on courses and admission to training places), and some may reflect market demand (e.g.,
available tenancies in Chambers).
12   See McCutcheon (1998).
13   As reported in the Times on 19 October 1998, page 10.
14 Judicial salaries can be found at the LCD web site http://www.open.gov.uk/lcd.
15  Civil juries in Scotland comprise 12 persons as opposed to the 15 used in criminal trials under
solemn procedure.  Jury trial have been abolished in the sheriff courts (since 1980), and in the Outer
House of the Court of Session they number only some 4 or 5 per year.10
injuries, libel and defamation.  While juries sometimes sit in certain personal injury
cases, they are extremely rare as most judges disallow them if there is any complexity,
e.g. a pension issue, involved.  Juries do not represent a serious expense in most civil
cases.
Witnesses in civil cases tend to be of the expert kind and are, consequently
remunerated at market rates for their service.  So while the time of witnesses and juries
represents an important social cost in terms of criminal justice, it creates less of a
problem in civil justice (save to the extent that the use of rival experts may permit a
prolongation of the procedure as a consequence of strategic manoeuvring by one or
both sides).
Alternative sources of supply.
Thus the state has a monopoly on court rooms and judges, and the legal
professions through their regulatory bodies have scope for restrictive practices
concerning admission to the professions, membership of the professions, and the way
in which the court system works.  As with all monopolies, however, competition may
be stimulated by the provision of near substitutes in the product market.  In this case,
private negotiation between parties or their agents may suffice to resolve any dispute --
no formality is needed.  A half way house between this unstructured atmosphere and
the regulated procedure-bound court room can be found in Alternative Dispute
Resolution (ADR).  Under this arrangement it is possible to choose a quasi-judicial
mode of arbitration by a third party under mutually agreed procedural rules, or,
alternatively, to have much more open ended and party-driven form of mediation
where the third party appears as a facilitator rather than an adjudicator.
Mediation is favoured in some US jurisdictions as a compulsory step prior to
formal court proceedings.  Although the idea of mediation finds much support in the
UK, with various groupings such as ACCORD (under the Law Society of Scotland),
CALM (Comprehensive Accredited Lawyer Mediators), CEDR (Centre for Dispute
Resolution), the Mediation Bureau, and many other agencies all offering mediation
services, there is empirically only a small part of court business that is diverted to
mediation.  Family law is the major exception here, as mediation is set to play an
increasingly important role in preventing marital breakups and in easing any child
custody decisions that do have to be made.  The reparation type business may be more
likely to involve mediation as a first step after a recent decision in England and Wales
that will allow Legal Aid expenditures to be used to support mediation.  Hitherto legal
aid could only be used to pay for the more formal court related procedures.
In general, the submission of a dispute to arbitration has the effect of excluding
the courts.  Subsequent appeal by one party to the court will have no effect if the
matter is judged to be contractual (either in the ex-ante sense of a contract clause or in
the ex-post sense of a post-dispute private agreement between the parties).  The
arbitrator’s award is generally final and cannot be appealed to a court, being open to
challenge only on procedural grounds.  The courts will, however, assist with the
enforcement of arbitrator’s awards.
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The legal professions have not been slow to move into these areas and, indeed,
it could be argued that such activity has always comprised an important part of their
work, albeit not always formally labelled as “alternative dispute resolution”.  The
important point is that the finding of a solution in all of these alternative situations pre-
supposes the existence of the formal court mechanism.  Much as the central bank, The
Bank of England, stands behind the UK monetary system guaranteeing its probity as
banker-of-last-resort, so the court system stands as an arbiter-of-last-resort.
Choice of procedure.
The resolution of many disputes can be achieved in a way that leaves both sides
better off.  Failure to agree can, in the jargon of the negotiation literature, “leave
money on the table”.  This is particularly true when the dispute or prospect of dispute
inhibits a mutually beneficial trade or commercial or other relationship.  Each mode of
dispute resolution has its own value-added.  Value-added arises from procedures that
allow new facts to emerge or different appraisals of solutions to be made.  Any value
added will, of course, be net of such transaction costs as are introduced by the dispute
resolution mechanism.  Indeed, in choosing among the various modes of dispute
resolution, lower costs will prove a prime attraction in many cases.  It can be argued
that the emergence of ADR in recent years is an indication of competitive forces in the
system.  A major dimension of this competition is the determination of the nature of
the procedural rules under which cases progress through the system.
From this perspective, Lord Woolf’s (1996) proposal that cases be allocated to
one of three tracks (small claims, fast track, and multi-track) based on the value of
claim involved
16 can be seen as product innovation.  These proposals are set to come
into force in April 1999 when active managerial intervention by judges will be
encouraged in an effort to move cases more expeditiously through the system.  As
time, or delay, can be expensive this must be applauded.  But there are non-trivial
resource implications owing to the substantial “up-front” input of judicial time that is
required.  A higher level of judge, Designated Civil Judges, has been created to
oversee this new aspect of the system.  In addition, it should be remembered that, in
any case, around 95% of all civil reparation cases settle before they reach trial or
proof. As the extra and early judicial input will be reflected in court fees, it might be
best if an element of choice was allowed in any “fast track”/”multi track” system of
case management.  If the two parties disagree, then there could be a judge-led process
of determining the appropriate procedural track
17.
Lord Cullen (1995) made related case-management proposals for the Outer
House of the Court of Session, but suggesting that track allocation be based on the
complexity of the case rather than the damages involved.  The reaction to the Cullen
report has been one of great caution.  In fact, it is tempting to recall Hume’s words
                                                       
16 With this division will come procedural restrictions, e.g., no cost shifting in small claims, and
substantial judicial involvement in case management for fast-track and multi-track.
17 A suggestion made by Zuckerman (1995, p. 171).12
when he described the disappointing public reaction
18 to the publication of his Treatise
of Human Nature, namely that “It fell dead-born from the press, without reaching such
distinction, as even to excite a murmur from the zealots”.  A kinder interpretation
might be that the legal establishment in Scotland has had time to benefit from the
results of a study of case management in the USA by the Rand Corporation’s  Institute
of Civil Justice (see Lord Gill, 1997).  This study suggests that case management is
extremely demanding on judicial time and effort, particularly in the early stages of
litigation (after which many cases settle out of court).
While advocating a liberalisation of procedure, we end this subsection with a
cautionary note.  Procedural reform can affect the relative costs of the various modes,
but lowering transaction costs, e.g., through reducing delay, is not always synonymous
with increased value for money.  Peacock (1994) makes the analogy with a symphony
orchestra striving for efficiency by playing its pieces at twice the appropriate speed,
thereby destroying the product!  Efficiency gains can be illusory in cheaper channels of
dispute resolution if what is produced leaves the parties worse off.
Risk and uncertainty.
Although we have emphasised the state’s monopoly in the provision of judicial
capacity and the regulated nature of other legal services, there is, as we have indicated
above, always a choice.  In terms of resolving a grievance a party can variously:  forget
it (allow the grievance to lapse); resolve matters privately;  use an agent but not the
court (ADR, etc.); or go to court.  Only in this last is the consumer directly exposed to
the impact of the regulated court system.  Indeed, the extent of demand for less formal
channels will depend in part on the degree of congestion, delay and expense involved
in utilising the formal sector.  The knowledge that any dispute, should one arise, can
end up in a formal court-room colours the way that all “upstream” negotiations are
handled.
One problem in taking formal legal action is that the costs are not known at the
outset.  It is like buying a product in a shop with little or no idea of what the final bill
will be.  Legal costs come in various forms: court fees; expert witness fees; lawyers’
fees; the possibility of being held liable for other party’s costs; delay; and strategic
behaviour of other party (including opportunistic use of discovery provisions,
extravagant case preparation, and so on).  Many of these costs are not exogenous, or
pre-set, but depend on the development of the case, the decisions taken by one’s own
legal representatives, and the decisions taken by the opponent’s legal representatives.
Thus, the other side in the dispute can increase the resource allocated to case
preparation or use of expert witnesses, or quality (expense) of legal counsel, and this
will call for similar if not matching expenditures.  That response in itself might then
                                                       
18   Hume’s disappointed reaction was premature, as history was to reveal -- but not in his lifetime.13
induce a further escalation, and so on in an upward spiral that brings no real advantage
to either side
19.
At the moment, the typical legal contract that exists between clients and their
lawyers looks very like the cost-plus style of contract that has traditionally produced
huge cost overruns in the defence industry. The client  is exposed to the expenditure of
his or her own legal representatives (while these expenses may be reported as they
arise, they are generally only roughly estimated in advance). But, the client is also
exposed to the rival’s legal bill should the verdict go the wrong way, or at least the
audited part of it (inter-partes costs, those judged absolutely necessary for conducting
the case and awarded against the loser).  Given that for at least one class of consumer
the experience is relatively rare, then one can expect some risk aversion.  By contrast
the legal representatives, this being their work day in and day out, can spread any risk
over a large number of cases.  It might consequently appear that there is scope here for
a mutually advantageous form of contracting that shifts the risk to the party best able
to bear it.  The Lord Chancellor, encouraged by Sir Peter Middleton’s (1997) report, is
currently considering the use of fixed fee contracts in England and Wales.
Consultation on the principles regarding civil court fees ended on May 1 1998, and
concrete proposals are expected soon.
At present, negotiating with one’s legal representative over price or method of
remuneration to apply in each case is difficult.  Indeed, certain fee contracts are
currently not allowed, and competing aggressively on the basis of price is explicitly
discouraged by the Law Society.  It has long been possible in Scotland for an advocate
to agree to operate on a speculative basis, whereby no fee is charged in the event of
defeat but a proportionately higher fee (e.g., a 50% premium on the fee computed on
hours of work) is charged if successful.  To date, this has not been commonly used,
although, as discussed above, the green light given by recent legislation to the use of a
similar type of “conditional fee” in England and Wales and to allow solicitors in
Scotland to operate on a speculative basis may well change this
20. The conditional fee
(no-win/ no-fee) has now been in operation since July 1995 and is generally judged a
success (Yarrow, 1998).  Insurance against having to pay the legal expenses of the
defence, in the eventuality of the plaintiff’s case being lost is now available from
Accident Line Protect (set up by the Law Society ) and Litigation Protection (a private
company) in England and Wales, and from  Compensure (set up by the Law Society of
Scotland) in Scotland.
The more full-blooded risk-shifting variant used in the USA, namely the
contingent fee, is not allowed in the UK.  That said, some commentators, e.g. Walker
(1997: 381), are of the view that nothing exists in law to prevent this arrangement in
Scotland, and Middleton (1997) has recommended active reconsideration of its
introduction in England and Wales.  In Scotland, at least one individual, acting in a
corporate rather than a personal or professional capacity, has exploited the fact that a
                                                       
19 See Main (1997, p. 6) for more detail.
20 The Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1990  makes the arrangement explicit
for solicitors in Scotland.  In a similar fashion so does the July 4 1995 changes made by the Lord
Chancellor, Lord Mackay, under the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990.14
non-professional person may advance funds to carry out litigation in return for
receiving a share of the recovery or damages if successful.  Assuming an interest of this
kind in a case is defined  as champerty (see Painter, 1995, and Tan, 1990) and was
traditionally debarred to professional lawyers in the UK owing to the bias in may
impart to professional judgement.  Contingency fees are explicitly excepted from
champerty doctrine in the USA (where the exemption was ratified by the Supreme
Court as long ago as 1877).
Third-party sources of costs.
Self-funding aside, demand is strongly affected by the prospect of someone else
picking up the tab.  Usually this prospect (other than courtesy of the judicially imposed
consequence of the British loser-pays rule) comes about through legal aid, trade union
backing, or legal expenses insurance.  In the last two, the person can be regarded as
making an efficient allocation of resources in the sense that the agent pays the expected
cost of the expense beforehand, in a risk pooling mechanism common to most
insurance schemes.  There are obvious self-selection problems and moral hazard
problems of the type that arise in any insurance situation, but given that both the
insurance company and the trade union are professional organisations then contract
design arrangements such as screening programs and co-insurance should minimise
these difficulties
21.
With legal aid, however, there is a more serious allocation problem.  In its
original form, legal aid placed qualified (means tested) individuals in a free or zero-
price situation.  Strict means testing and recently instituted reforms involving moves
toward co-payments eliminate some of this difficulty, but legal aid clients are
undoubtedly presented with stronger incentives to litigate than other citizens
(particularly those in the middle-income range).  The position of a legal aid litigant is
further strengthened by the deviation from the English rule in the event of such a
plaintiff losing -- they are not generally held liable for the other side’s costs.  This
advantage gives the plaintiff with legal aid a substantial advantage in pre-trial
bargaining.  Recognised as an “oppressive effect” in a recent Lord Chancellor’s
Department report
22, the intention is that lawyers will share risks with clients under
conditional fee arrangements.  Moves in England and Wales to divert all Legal Aid
Board personal injury cases (with the exception of medical malpractice) to a
conditional fee arrangement, plus the encouragement given to the franchising or block
purchase of legal aid, and the possible development of more broadly based Community
Legal Service should counter some of these incentive problems.  There is also a
current recommendation that the costs of insurance (Accident Line Protect,
Compensure etc.) be recoverable from the other side by the successful plaintiff as a
disbursement.  The success fee component of the conditional fee will also be
recoverable along with other taxed costs.
                                                       
21  In the past, insurance companies have found themselves constrained in this field by EU law
guaranteeing individual freedom of choice of solicitor, and by certain aspects of champerty and the
related concept of maintenance, see Rickman and Fenn, 1998, p. 217.
22   See Access to Justice with Conditional Fees. A Lord Chancellor’s Department Consultation Paper,
March 1998, para. 3.4.15
In Scotland, the recent government position paper on civil legal aid, Access To
Justice. Beyond the Year 2000, suggests that more lawyers may be employed directly
by the Scottish Legal Aid Board (SLAB), to work in advice centres providing a first
layer of legal advice that might go some way to separating the agency function (of
prescribing the possible cure to the problem) from the service function (of delivering
that cure) -- the principal-agent problem that is often cited as leading to supplier-
induced demand in medicine, the law, and other professions.  Moves on funding and
fixed fees are less well advanced in civil legal aid in Scotland, as the argument
regarding inefficiency is rebutted with statistics showing that the Scottish Legal Aid
Board recovers (out of damages awards, fee awards, and client contributions) over
80% of all expenses relating to reparation cases.  This is taken as evidence that the
“merits test” is already working.  Under the merits test, solicitors are meant to estimate
the chances of the case prevailing if it were to go to trial or proof as being reasonable,
before applying for legal aid on behalf of their client.  Lord Irvine has suggested
23 that
the merit test should be strengthened to stipulate a 75% likelihood of success as a
funding condition. Clearly, the civil aid system is in for further substantial reform.
Rather than rationing access, it might be better to try to think of ways that can
encourage as many people as possible to have access to dispute-resolution facilities of
the courts.  Innovative procedure, funding mechanisms and fee charging can all play a
part here.
Other sources of demand.
There are other more macro causes of demand for civil justice.  These are
primarily societal in nature, and include the rise of so-called dysfunctional families, and
the increased prevalence of employment rights that have accompanied the extensive
passage of statute law covering the labour market.  This last development includes
trade union law, as, while there are now fewer trade union rights, somewhat
paradoxically there are many more trade union laws on the statute book.  There has
also been a marked social change that has encouraged civil litigation.  In general, we
now live in a more assertive and rights-conscious society.  The general attitude among
the public has changed and people are much more likely to sue for their rights.
Product specification.
We, therefore, have a complex product whose quality and characteristics are
difficult to ascertain before purchase and, partly in consequence, whose supply is
heavily regulated.  Demand for this product is a “derived demand”, resting on the
demand for dispute resolution.  Changing social mores and the increased complexity of
modern life seem set to drive this demand upwards.  It is at the interface between
supply and demand where the price is set and the quantity/quality agreed hat seems to
offer most scope for product innovation.  In both England and Wales and in Scotland,
there are initiatives being taken by the government to change the legal aid system.
These changes will have a direct influence on the way all civil cases are dealt with.  In
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change would require legislation and will be unnecessary if there is a major move to conditional fees,
although it will still have a bearing on family work.16
addition, there are general procedural changes being made -- particularly, but not
exclusively, in case management.  These are likely to have a significant impact. They
demonstrate that change is possible.  Change and innovation could also be encouraged
in a more general sense, e.g., between client and lawyer in contracting for service, or
between lawyer and lawyer in agreeing procedure.  But this would require much more
information and much more attention to freedom to contract than appears to exist at
the moment.
III.  Externality
If the volume of litigation were the sole measure of the benefit to society of the
resolution of disputes, then there would be little to distinguish judicial services from
the provision of other goods and services in the market.  Those unwilling to pay for the
services could be denied them (exclusion) and the benefits arising from the resolution
of a dispute would be confined to that particular individual case (rival consumption).
Even if the courts were endowed with a monopoly, it is possible to devise schemes
which would simulate competitive pricing, a matter which has received some attention
from economists
24.  But the claim that there are benefits other than those accruing to
litigants using court services must lead one to look more closely at the process of
dispute resolution and the case for government intervention.
A common argument for supporting the case for the existence of benefits which
accrue to those other than litigants in court is that of the creation of certain precedents
(Fiss, 1984).  In principle, the establishment of precedent in disputes may reduce
uncertainty in the minds of subsequent litigants and their advisers about how to
proceed with a case.  Precedents are constantly evolving as a result of new situations
which arise from often rapid changes in economic and social conditions.  However,
whether precedents have the power to reduce transaction costs to litigants to any
major extent has yet to be empirically tested and is often disputed in principle.
Measurement would require the calculation of the amount of dispute expenses
(lawyers fees being an obvious one) that are avoided when a precedent clarifies what
had until then been a disputed area of the law.  One would also have to add the
efficiency gains obtained through operating the economy under the new rule.  It is
necessary to bear in mind, however, that only a tiny proportion of judgements ever
lead to anything approaching a precedent.  The small number of cases that are
appealed, and the even smaller number that result in a judgement of material
significance to the interpretation of the law, bears witness to this fact.  The vast
proportion of judgements resolve purely private disputes whereby no third party is any
the wiser or better off.
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need to provide judges with a financial incentive to expedite justice.  Other writers such as Benson
(1997), Bernstein (1992), Friedman (1979), and Landes and Posner (1979) have examined the
possibility of private systems of law enforcement and adjudication.17
In any case, a more empirically robust argument can be made for the manner in
which the courts influence the process by which all disputes are resolved.  The fact that
the courts operate in a more or less recognisable and predictable way and with a
known standard of accuracy is likely to encourage out-of-court settlement, which is
clearly less expensive.  As it happens, a large proportion of cases in Scotland, England
and Wales, North America, and elsewhere, perhaps exceeding 95 per cent in most
years, are settled between filing and a court appearance for judgement or proof,
although admittedly the settlement often occurs only at the door of the court itself.
The influence  of the courts extends back into encouragement to disputing parties to
settle grievances without going near a lawyer’s office.  The influence of the role of the
courts extends even to increasing the confidence of individuals to enter contracts that
offer mutually advantageous gains, but clarifying what is likely to happen in the event
of one party or other not complying with all details of the agreement.  The courts
through their actions and decisions also persuade all actors in the economy to behave
with due regard to the necessity to exercise a reasonable amount of care, bearing in
mind the costs of litigation that will ensue in the event of harm being caused.  In short,
a socially efficient (but not zero) level of litigation encourages beneficial economic
activity.
While we argue above that ADR and the like provide a competitive source of
dispute resolution that tends to undermine any attempt by the formal system to exploit
its monopoly power, at the same time there are disadvantages to private-channel
dispute resolution.  The public is deprived of information, the deterrence of negative
behaviour is made less likely, there is no information gained as would be from a public
trial, and there is no public exposure of either party.  In addition, the very secrecy of
ADR procedures opens up the possibility that settlements that are contrary to the
public interest may be allowed to be made (e.g., involving monopolistic exploitation of
third parties or a restraint of trade).  Of course, the public is not concerned (or not
primarily so) with the social purpose of litigation.  The decision to proceed to law or
ADR is based primarily on private preference and private calculus as to the costs and
benefits.  But a court system with lower transaction costs will place downward
pressure on dispute resolution costs throughout the system.  As long as accuracy is not
disproportionately weakened, then there should be an increase in value added, both in
terms of disposing with court cases and in terms of expanding the margin of disputes
that are resolved in one venue or another) and an extension of the margin of harm that
is redressed or avoided.  This then allows more mutually advantageous contracts and
exchanges to be effected.
It is more difficult to judge whether these arguments are sufficiently strong to
justify large public subsidy of the civil justice system.  Such subsidies in a system that is
still quite heavily regulated are always in danger of capture by vested interests within
the system.  What does seem clear is that increased competitiveness and increased
flexibility in contracting offers gains to society that extend well beyond those identified
as directly consuming the services of the civil justice system.18
IV.  Remedies for market imperfection
In addition to the positive externality discussed above, the imperfection in this market
concerns its regulated nature.  With an administratively determined number of judges
and court rooms, and a complex bureaucratic process of determining procedural rules
(and hence product specification), it is very easy for this market to underperform.  We
argue in this subsection that increased information, choice and product diversity should
all be used in shaping a way forward.  It is clear that a court system that uses resources
efficiently is something that is to be desired.  But efficient need not mean the lowest
unit cost per court case.  The system might be very cheap but so hopeless at
determining fault as to be little better than a lottery (see Main, 1997, and Peacock
1998).  In this case economic activity and private contracting will be discouraged.
At the same time, an extremely high unit cost system could offer an unerring
accuracy in determining the truth (although a problem arises in cases where the
concept of truth is elusive).  Such a system would provide the parties with an incentive
to settle out of court and would provide all parties ex ante with the confidence to enter
into all mutually beneficial contracts and exchanges.  Of course, such extremely high
costs, if that is the price of accuracy, could deter the risk averse litigant or the
individual who has difficulty in funding an action.  This latter point is a distributional
problem that will be discussed in the next section.
In terms of efficiency, there are two issues.  The first is to determine which
type of system is the best.  The second is to determine how to bring that system about.
Current arrangements for reform in the judicial system involve a period of long,
sometimes hesitant, but generally careful consideration followed by the imposition of
any changes -- possibly after piloting and modification
25, but with the expectation that
the innovation will be applied uniformly and will last some time.  Direct regulation of
the system is what happens now, and it is certainly capable of delivering improvements
on the status quo.  Given the externality considerations explored above, it is clear that
some public subsidy of the court system can be justified.  The main challenge, then, is
to devise ways that recognise the regulated (and subsidised) nature of the market while
ensuring that transaction costs are kept low and product innovations are encouraged.
Low user-costs and allowing the consumer plentiful information and choice promises
substantial dividends here.
The structure of costs.
One key parameter in this system is the matter of costs.  In England and  Wales
excessive costs by opposing lawyers can be checked by vigorous use of wasted-costs
orders, whereby legal representatives may be ordered to meet certain legal costs
personally where that representative has been guilty of gross inefficiency or wilful
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obstruction.  Such awards are currently very rare
26.  Costs themselves are already
recognised in various modes:  inter-partes costs, solicitor and client basis (somewhat
more generous), and solicitor and own client basis (allowing all expenses reasonably
incurred for the benefit of the client).   More flexibility could be deployed here, with
cost orders being imposed even on cases that settle at or before reaching the
courtroom door.  All legal costs can currently be challenged and subjected to audit or
taxation. One suggestion by Middleton (1997, 2.44) is that not only should fixed price
fees be agreed in advance but that these be filed with the court so that the award of
costs when the case terminates would be based on the lower of the two figures. A set
percentage of this would be paid by the client depending on the stage reached in
proceedings, but any inter-partes costs would be computed on the basis of the lower
of the fixed costs faced by the two parties.  These practices could be incorporated in
the efficiency norm for legal services.
Choice of fee structures.
For consumers to be able to choose, there is a requirement for information
regarding the service and its accompanying terms and conditions.  Zuckerman (1995)
draws on recommendations from the Australian Advisory Committee on Access to
Justice to suggest that lawyers should ensure that clients have not only details on the
method by which the final bill will be computed but also an estimate of the total costs
that are likely.  This to be accompanied by an estimate of the chances of success and
the cost implications of failure.  This information might also contain some details
regarding alternative approaches to resolving the problem (in a non-litigious manner).
We would go further and recommend (echoing Middleton) that there be an expectation
that lawyers will be prepared to quote a fixed fee for handling the case (subject to
insurance cover regarding the other side’s costs, an increasingly common facility,
discussed above).  In this way, the risk of proceeding to litigation could be spread over
many infrequent consumers of legal services -- shifted, if one likes, from the
inexperienced client to the lawyer who is in a better position to spread this risk.
Of course, these problems are currently not being faced to nearly the same
extent by those (now relatively few) persons who qualify for full legal aid.  The
subsidised cost of legal services and the general immunity from other side’s costs in the
event of failure results in a very different incentive structure when it comes to deciding
whether or not to proceed to litigation.  There is now a check made on a sample of all
legal aid claims, although this process is currently seen to be ineffective (see Gray et
al., 1996).  More vigorous policing of such billings may well be introduced, although
the intrinsic problem is not one of fraud but of the incentive structure that is built into
the system with the state (or the other party) being left with most of the risk.  The
planned move to conditional fees for all personal injury cases (except medical
malpractice) and a system of tendering for legal aid contracts or franchises on the basis
of fixed prices will mitigate this incentive problem (see Middleton, 1997, 3.18).  There
may also be a move to fixed fee business in civil legal aid (as is emerging in criminal
legal aid), although initial work by Goriely (1997) suggests this may be impracticable.
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Choice of standard of procedural complexity.
One other possible innovation from an efficiency point of view is to further
deregulate the system by allowing the consumer to choose from competing standards
of representation and procedural complexity (rules of evidence, rules of discovery
etc.).  Matters could be arranged that the lowest cost alternative should dominate
when the parties disagree, although subject to judicial oversight, see Zuckerman
(1995).  In this way agents will find the standard of justice that suits them best.  What
is being suggested here is that the system be made less monolithic, and that individuals
be permitted to experiment and innovate by allowing more opportunity for direct
expression of consumer choice. Competitive pressure can also be increased in the
system, not simply by adjusting the volume of judicial services available but also by
introducing innovative court-based procedures that are sensitive to consumer demands
-- for example, through the capping of legal expense to be incurred, or agreed
limitations regarding the discovery and treatment of evidence (expert or otherwise), or
to the design of the fee contract (between client and lawyer), and allowing the cost-
shifting rule to be agreed between the parties.  Lord Woolf’s reforms have led to the
establishment of certain pre-action protocols, e.g., in the use of expert witness(es)
27.
This leaves the question of the positive externality to be addressed.  Our
previous argument suggests that cases which are likely to set a precedent and, hence,
have a bearing on all subsequent cases of that type should be eligible for public
funding.  These have been identified as public interest cases by Middleton (1997, 5.17)
who recommends a fourth track under the new English system with a special fund
administered by the Legal Aid Board to cover their costs.  A clear analogy can be
drawn here with the Law Commissioners of the Inland Revenue being prepared to bear
both parties’ costs in cases that are seen to be important in clarifying the interpretation
of a piece of tax code.
Subsidy.
There is also a case for some public funding of the civil courts because of the
way in which the efficient disposition of cases reaching court allows individuals
throughout the economy to avoid expensive pre-dispute contracting that would
otherwise be necessary to protect their interests.  Some commentators, such as
Gravelle (1996), regard the prospect of determining when and where such public
subsidy to be justified to be so complex that simply following market pricing at all
stages of the process may, on balance, be the most effective approach.  It is certainly
true that market-responsive pricing would represent a marked improvement on the
current administrative arrangements.  The courts are well placed to take the lead here.
Judicial capacity could easily be made more responsive to market pressure.  If pricing
for access to court adjusts more flexibly to demand, in a way that reduces unwanted
waiting time, then the entire system of dispute resolution will benefit from an increase
in competition.
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The judicial capacity in the system could be made more responsive to consumer
demand by ensuring that court fees not only cover the running costs (including judicial
salaries) but are allowed to lead directly to the appointment of additional judges as
demand conditions reflect.  While we argue above that ADR and the like provide a
competitive source of dispute resolution that tends to undermine any attempt by the
formal system to exploit its monopoly power.  This is because ADR and other
mechanisms operate in the shadow of the law and, at the margin, compete with the
judicial system for business.
Multi-dimensional approach.
In general, the system should encourage innovation in technique and
procedure.  By increasing the freedom to experiment with rival systems of procedural
arrangements -- whether low-cost, abbreviated proceedings, or case-management, or
more inquisitorial based procedures -- then consumers are able to choose, cafeteria
style, the level of justice that suits their needs,  There is already evidence of change,
but, to date, it has all come through a concerted effort with co-ordination across the
whole judicial system.  There is little room in the present system for experimentation or
innovation.  For example, the abolition of the notion of inferior courts with their
restricted jurisdictions (for example, the sheriff courts in Scotland) would free parties
to choose the venue in which to debate their cause
28.  Sheriffdoms having shorter
queues or more attractive procedures would gain business to the detriment of those
with a less attractive product range.  Multiple of track -- based on financial value of the
cause in Woolf, and on legal complexity in Cullen -- is a good idea that could compete
in the market place of procedures alongside other innovations, preferably ones that
provide consumers with choice.
V.  Distributional considerations
If, as is being suggested here, the state sector (courts) increases its reliance on market
pricing as a way of determining the allocation of judicial resources, both towards tried
and tested products (procedures) and for the more experimental specifications, there
may well be an increase in the distributional problem owing to those with lower
household income not being able to afford to go to court.  Of course many households
cannot afford the luxury of a car.  Some cannot even afford to take a bus.  This does
not generally call for market intervention
29.  But it is widely accepted that there is a
communal interest in removing financial barriers to access to the courts.  This
argument is usually sustained by a wide acceptance of the view that access to justice
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should not be hindered by lack of means.  There is also a general interest in having all
valid grievances pursued irrespective of the economic circumstances of the litigant.
Edward (1993, p.13) argues:
It is the litigant who identifies abuse of power and calls for it to be restrained.
It is the litigant dissatisfied with the lame bureaucratic excuse who calls for a
proper explanation.  It is the litigant, refusing to lie down under political
pressure or administrative highhandedness, who makes a nuisance of himself
and goads his lawyer to action.....
All well and good.  But surely not at any cost -- or at least not at any cost on the
public purse.
A valid reparation claim going unheard suggests an imperfection in the capital
market or extreme risk aversion.  An imperfect capital market becomes a problem
when the injured party cannot sell the claim or borrow on the strength of the case to
pursue the claim.    Risk aversion arises when the party, possibly because of reduced
personal circumstances, is not prepared to accept the risk of the litigation failing or
disappointing.  Both circumstances are likely with low income households.  The
solution to date has been to provide legal aid.  This ends up being expensive and
exacerbates the supplier-induced demand problem that is present when any non-repeat
buyer has to purchase legal services (Bowles 1996).  Policing mechanisms for the use
and misuse of legal aid are not regarded as having been successful (Gray et al. 1996).
An alternative solution to legal aid is to allow conditional fee arrangements,
whereby the risk and the capital outlay falls on the lawyer.  For certain classes of
grievance this seems to offer a viable solution and its use in all cases involving personal
injury damages (excluding medical malpractice) in England and Wales, as was
mentioned above, is currently emerging as the norm.  But, for other types of dispute,
what is often at stake are points of principle involving all-or-nothing outcomes where
any pecuniary quantification of the issues is difficult, or inappropriate, and where
financial compensation as mitigation is either not practicable (because of wealth
constraints) or is not meaningful.  Family law, and child custody in particular, is an
area where such problems arise.   In such situations, it is difficult to see how a person
of  modest means can enter into a gain-sharing arrangement with a lawyer.
One possible improvement would be to arrange the provision of state funds
(through franchises) to be allocated in a contestable way over a variety of cases in a
variety of jurisdictions and in a variety of classes of courtroom.  Performance could be
judged by some weighting (politically determined) given to each type of case and
allocated in much the same way as public spending across various medical services is
allocated in certain states in the USA (see Dingwall et al., 1997, and Williams, 1995).
If such a weighting system of public fund allocation is adopted, it would be important
to include in the payment mechanism that the government uses to reward the agency
responsible (the Legal Aid Board or the Community Legal Services Agency) a measure
of disputes not reaching the formal stage of a summons being issued but which are
resolved privately.  These too are as much a part of the service delivery of the civil
justice system as the cases that reach the courts.23
One problem that arises is if the maximisation of the performance criteria per se
leads to behaviour that is not wholly consistent with the maximisation of the true
objective --  the delivery of quality service.  This is likely to occur when the defined
performance targets are not adequately drawn up.  This dysfunctional impact of non-
market incentive systems was a common problem in centrally planned economies
(where “the plan” might suggest a production target of 1 million washers but omit to
specify the diameter, thickness or some other vital aspect, leading to the production of
the least-cost version that “complies” with the plan).
Allowing the choice of venue to be contestable would add an element of
competition on the supply side.  Benchmark competition could also be introduced by
the provision of state employed solicitors (along the lines of the Edinburgh pilot of the
Public Defenders Solicitors Office for criminal defence in Scotland).  The absence of
consumer choice of lawyer in such arrangements has been answered by Lord Hardie
(1997, p. 483) in terms of expecting to be able to choose the roofer when he hires
someone to fix his roof, but not expecting to have a say in the selection of the pilot
when he flies down to London.  But it is worth remembering, in the context of publicly
employed solicitors, that in trying to repair one market imperfection, another may be
introduced -- here in the form of organisational failure, namely a nationalised service.
For the middle classes who are among the most vociferous critics regarding
their restricted access to justice, the simple fact will remain.  You pay your money and
you take your choice.  Encouraging reform of the system to become a more cafeteria-
style of arrangement, by enlarging that choice and possibly putting downward pressure
on the money needed to “have one’s day in court”, may extend some more palatable
modes of dispute resolution, even to the middle classes.
VI.  Conclusions
Reform in England and Wales currently seems to be developing a head of steam
(Middleton, 1997), and in Scotland the recent reforms in the sheriff courts (Morris and
Headrick (1995), and Samuel and Bell (1997)) reassures us that the idea of reform is
far from a novelty to the Scottish legal system. In terms of dispute resolution, the state
sector, in the guise if the civil justice system, influences the way negotiations are
carried out and ensures agreements are enforced (diligence).  But it is also a major
source of dispute resolution in its own right, and it is in this way that it exerts a major
influence on dispute resolution and individual behaviour throughout the whole
economy.  Increased competitiveness in the state sector will invigorate the entire
system of dispute resolution, to the benefit of all and not just for those who go to
court.
There are in circulation many good ideas regarding procedural reform in the
civil justice system.  These include fast track procedures, judicial case management,
conditional fees, contingent fees, franchising of legal aid, and so on.  Rather than
striving ex ante to find the optimum combination of these possibilities and imposing it24
on the entire system of civil justice, one possibility would be to introduce a market-led
expansion of judicial capacity  by allowing court fees to be determined by market
forces with the proceeds ploughed back into judicial capacity.  This would provide
more competition for the alternative dispute resolution industry and be to the benefit of
consumers of dispute resolution services (both of the formal court-based variety  and
ADR).  Given that the object of the system of civil justice is to further the interests of
those who pay for it -- whether directly by fees or indirectly through the tax system --
one is  bound to ask whether the safeguards in place in the existing system offer the
most effective way of furthering that end.
A reasonable defence might be offered for the view that the suppliers of the
judicial services are so constrained by professional ethics, by law, and by associated
regulations, that clients are indeed well served.  That defence might be elaborated as
follows:  (i) solicitors and advocates/barristers are bound by professional standards
enforced by their professional associations to advise clients whether or not to proceed
with or to defend an action and to reveal if there are circumstances which prevent them
taking on a case, e.g., a conflict of interest or doubts about the identity of the principal
of whom the lawyer is the agent;  (ii) lawyers, following “client care” rules,  are
enjoined to clarify how their charges are computed and to warn clients that the final bill
is beyond their control because of uncertainties surrounding the time scale, the
complexity and the outcome of the action; and (iii) a comprehensive procedure is in
place in order to deal with complaints by clients about the service offered by lawyers.
Whatever the merits of this defence of the status quo, the individual client not
continually engaged in litigation is in an exposed position
30.  The nature of the
“product”, justice, is elusive and is naturally defined by the client as a judgement in her
favour, an outcome which cannot be guaranteed whatever the cost incurred.  For many
consumers, the assessment of the chances of success in an action cannot be based on
the experience derived from regular purchase of the service, but rests on the quality of
the advice of the lawyer who, unless his services are in excessive demand, has an
interest in going to law on the client’s behalf.  While it may be appreciated that a
lawyer cannot give a precise estimate of the cost of proceeding with or defending a
case, except as to explain how charges are made up, he can benefit materially from the
length and complexity of an action.  These factors may reflect the desire to maintain
the quality of justice, but it is the client who pays for this and not the lawyers, unless it
is agreed to share these costs as with a “no-win no-fee” system.
While a comprehensive complaints system may act as a deterrent to
professional negligence and malpractice, it can only operate retrospectively, which is of
little use to an individual client who has needlessly lost a case and who has to incur the
time and expense involved in pursuing a complaint.  In any case, the Legal
Ombudsmen for Scotland and for England and Wales have no means at their disposal
to obtain redress for clients to discipline or fine lawyers along the lines available to the
regulators of the personal pensions system.
                                                       
30 A casual reading of McCormack’s ‘The Terrible Truth About Lawyers’ (1987) brings this home quite
clearly.25
In short, the client is, as we have already suggested, rather like the position of
those obliged to accept “cost-plus” contracts once they are locked onto a transaction
in which the outcome is far from certain.  Their defences against “exploitation” suggest
an agenda for making the judicial system more responsive to individual needs.
First, as in defence contracting, some form of competitive tendering offering
and incentive for suppliers  of legal services to give the fullest information on the
nature of the service provided.  Informative advertising should be the rule rather than
the exception.  Voluntary organisations supporting ordinary citizens, such as the
Citizens’ Advice Bureaux should press professional legal bodies for the fullest
description of lawyers’ services and obligations.  One step forward would be to break
down the process of seeking redress in law to a two part process whereby advice as to
what is needed or what is possible could be obtained form one source, while that
prescription could be filled by another source, possibly after some shopping around.
The advice network proposed in Access to Justice.  Beyond the Year 2000 may be a
step in this direction.  There will be difficulties here, however, as the nature of the
remedy is so tightly bound to the delivery of the remedy.  Persuading one practitioner
to accept blindly and follow the prescription of another practitioner would threaten
professional values.  But franchising and competitive tendering for legal aid contracts
may eventually make this approach more generally acceptable.
Second, and as a possible adjunct to the above approach, clients must be
informed of the alternative ways in which they an pursue or defend an action, including
seeking agreement on whether to go for the “fast-track” method, ADR, or follow the
conventional routes.  Information about alternative sources of the supply of justice,
with the prospects that quality has to be traded off against cost, should be a clearly
recognised professional responsibility.  Alternative procedural arrangements and fee
contracts should be investigated, and product innovation encouraged.
Third, the client must be assured that the discretionary element introduced into
the costs that he must bear as a result of entering the judicial process are minimised, if
not eliminated.  This reinforces the view that the cardinal element in his protection is
efficient management of the process.  This could involve giving power to trial judges
to control the passage of a case from the time it is raised until it is decided -- case
management.  In other words, the task can only be assigned to those who have no
financial interest in the judicial prices involving the case.  How this is to be achieved is
a sensitive matter because it entails a radical change in the existing system.
Fourth, the supply of judges must be addressed.  It certainly seems reasonable
that the supply of judges should be made more responsive to market signals.  Charging
court fees to reflect full costs is a start in this direction.  The logical step after that is to
initiate additional judicial appointments where market projections suggest they can be
self-sustaining in revenue terms.  The positive externality aspect of civil justice can be
addressed by subsidising identified “public interest” cases as has been suggested in the
context of legal aid reform, or by subsidising court proceedings in general (and
particularly at the appeal stage).  The problem is as old as Adam Smith (1776), who
puzzled over the question of how to offer incentives to judges to dispense justice
efficiently.  Interestingly enough, he considered that judges should be paid per case and
should be paid only when the case was completed!26
Such is the case of the advocates of reform, following the principle of
maximising benefits to the consumers of justice.  If the principle is accepted, but the
suggested reforms are not, then the onus of proof lies with critics to show why they
should be rejected and/or how they might be improved.  Not to accept the principle,
however, risks leaving the legal profession open to the charge that the system of civil
justice is a Ding an sich designed primarily to promote their own interests.27
Glossary of terms.
Advocate:  in Scotland this job title is equivalent to barrister in England and Wales
and, perhaps, trial-lawyer in the USA.  It, as the title suggests, is a lawyer who
specialises in pleading or arguing a case (usually in court).  Advocates no longer have
the sole right of audience in the Court of Session as solicitor-advocates may now
appear.
Bar Council:  is the professional body the regulates the profession of barrister, i.e.,
those who specialise in trial procedure and, until 1995, had the sole right of audience in
the Crown Court and the High Court in England and Wales.
Champerty:  is where a third party funds litigation in an understanding that they will
receive part of the damages recovered by the plaintiff if the case is successful.
Occasionally this concept is grouped with barratry and maintenance (see painter,
1995).  Traditionally forbidden in England and Wales, the common law offence was
abolished in the Criminal Law Act 1967, and in 1995 the Lord Chancellor, under the
provisions of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990, explicitly permitted conditional
fees which allow the lawyer and client to agree on a fee-plus-uplift if successful and
no-fee if unsuccessful (as opposed to contingent fees where a given percentage of the
damages goes to the plaintiff’s legal team in lieu of fees).  The uplift could be up to
100% of the normal hourly-based fee, where lower uplifts would be appropriate when
the probability of success was higher.
Circuit Judge:  Judges (part-time) in the Crown Court (criminal) system in England
and Wales who will have served at least 3 years as a Recorder.
Civil justice:  the civil justice system is that part of the legal system that is available to
individuals who wish to seek redress or compensation for some wrong done to them.
It includes matters relating to contracts, personal injury and family matters.  It should
be contrasted with the criminal justice system which, almost always, concerns the
behaviour of the state as it seeks to punish and hence deter wrong-doing.
Court of Session:  senior court for civil procedures in Scotland.  It is a court of first
instance (the Outer House) with a jurisdiction that substantially overlaps that of the
sheriff courts.  It hears appeals form the sheriff courts, can hear own appeals (in the
Inner House) and case can be appealed to the House of Lords.
Diligence:  is the enforcement of any court ruling obtained against a defender.
Discovery provisions:  the entitlements available to each party in terms of examining
the evidence available to the other side in advance of a court-room appearance.  This is
essentially integrated into the Scottish system of written pleadings where the
arguments and rebuttals that comprise the kernel of the case must be carefully laid out
to the agreement of both sides.28
District Judge:  judges in  the county court (civil) system in England and Wales.
Formally (until 1990) known as county court registrars.
Faculty of Advocates:  the professional body that regulates the conduct of advocates
in the Scottish courts  (cf. the Bar Council in England and Wales for barristers).
High Court:  In England and Wales this is the most senior court of first instance.  In
criminal procedure it ranks above the crown courts (which are themselves superior to
the Magistrates Courts).  In civil procedure the High Court ranks above the County
Courts which are senior to the Magistrates Courts.  In Scotland, the High Court is the
superior court of criminal jurisdiction (sitting above the sheriff courts and the district
courts).  Only criminal proceedings are heard in the High Court in Scotland (the Court
of Session being the equivalent civil procedure court).
Inter-partes costs:  This is the category of costs that are allowed, subject to the
scrutiny of the Taxing Master in England and Wales or the Auditor of the Court in
Scotland,  when the losing side is required to pay the other party’s costs (as is
generally the case under the “English rule”).  This is a less generous or less all-
encompassing basis that “solicitor-and-own-client costs”.  See Hurst (1995).
Loser-pays:  sometimes known as the “English rule” but, in truth, the approach
adopted in most jurisdictions outside of North America, whereby the losing party is
responsible for paying the legal fees and expenses of the prevailing party.  This
contrasts with the “American rule” where, in general, each side pays their own costs
irrespective of the outcome.
Proof:  Trial in a civil case before a judge sitting without a jury in the Scottish system.
Queen’s Counsel:  In England and Wales this is a senior level of barrister appointed,
on consultation, by the Lord Chancellor.  The term “silk” is sometimes used in a
reference to the style of gown worn.  This elevation usually means a higher fee can be
commanded.  A roughly similar system applies for advocates in Scotland.
Recorders:  Judges (part-time) in the Crown Court (criminal) system in England and
Wales and appointed for a limited period.
Reparation:  the area of Scots law, sometimes known as delict and similar to tort in
the English system, where one individual seeks compensation, or some other remedy,
from another party for an infringement of his/her legal rights by that other party.
Sheriff courts:  courts in Scotland that hear both civil and criminal cases over a wide
range of gravity and importance.  Jurisdiction of each court is restricted to that of a
particular sheriffdom (there are 49 sheriffs courts organised into 6 sheriffdoms).  Very
minor criminal cases are more likely to go to the District Courts, particularly serious
criminal cases to the High Court, and particularly complex civil cases to the Court of
Session.   The senior judge in each of the six sheriffdoms known as Sheriff Principal
and the other judges, each assigned to a particular sheriffdom, are known as sheriffs.29
Summary Cause:  In the sheriff courts this applies to a case where the value of the
cause does not exceed £1500 -- usually related to recovery of debts or possessions.
Somewhat relaxed procedural rules apply regarding the recording of evidence given
etc.
Taxed costs:  when, under the system of cost allocation that is generally used in
Europe, the losing side is ordered to pay the costs (‘expenses’ in Scotland) of the
successful party in a civil litigation, the costs that must be so paid are subject to the
scrutiny of the court.  This is done by a Taxing Master in England and Wales and by
the Auditor of Court in Scotland.  The costs so awarded are usually inter-partes costs
(see above).
Tort:  is the part of the common law that relates to civil justice.  The area is known as
delict in Scotland.  Common law is the body of law that is judge-made, in the sense
that it rests on previous cases and the judgements therein. It can be contrasted with
public law which generally concerns various laws passed by parliament.30
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